This note raises some issues on the C-OAR-SE procedure for scale development in marketing recently proposed by Rossiter [Rossiter, J.R. (2002). The C-OAR-SE procedure for scale development in marketing. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 19,. Specifically, it identifies some potentially problematic areas under the various steps of C-OAR-SE and also questions the procedure's sole reliance on content validity. The objective is to generate further debate on C-OAR-SE as an effective approach for scale development efforts. D
Introduction
The recent article by John Rossiter in this journal (Rossiter, 2002) brought another breath of fresh air in the marketing literature on measure development. Like the recent JMR paper by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) , Rossiter (2002) demonstrated that there is life beyond classical test theory, the domain sampling model and coefficient alpha. Unlike Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, however, Rossiter did not confine his treatment to formative measurement but proposed a general procedure for developing marketing measures. This (C-OAR-SE) procedure resulted in a six-fold classification of measures, allowing for both reflective and formative perspectives as well as single-and multi-item scales (see Table 3 in Rossiter, 2002) . Rossiter should be congratulated for his efforts not least because the almost blind adherence of marketing academics to the scale development approaches first popularized by Churchill (1979) and Nunnally (1978) bhas led to some absurd practices such as the mechanistic application of exploratory factor analysis models to identify the dimensionality of constructs or the expectation of journal referees that unless the almost dmagicalT 0.70 level is reached by coefficient alpha, a multi-item measure dcannot be any goodT. . . In the process, theory goes out of the windowQ (Diamantopoulos, 1999, pp. 453-454) .
The purpose of this brief research note is to contribute to the debate on measure development in 0167-8116/$ -see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi: 10.1016/j.ijresmar.2003.08.002 marketing by raising some issues on the C-OAR-SE procedure proposed by Rossiter (2002) . The aim is to stimulate further thought and discussion by (a) identifying some potentially problematic aspects of the procedure, and (b) offering suggestions for resolving them. For ease of exposition, the relevant headings of the original Rossiter paper will also be followed here.
C-OAR-SE: theory
2.1. Construct definition 1 According to Rossiter (2002) , the first step in scale development involves the conceptual definition of the construct. This definition bshould specify the object, the attribute, and the rater entityQ (p. 309), because otherwise bthe conceptual definition of the construct will be inadequate for indicating how the construct should be (operationally) measuredQ (p. 308, emphasis added). He then illustrates this by taking service quality as an example and stating that bOne cannot conceive of SERVICE QUALITY in the abstract. . . IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY IBM'S MANAGERS is a different bphenomenon of theoretical interestQ than IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY INDUS-TRY EXPERTS or IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY CUSTOMERSQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 309) .
A problem with this line of argument is that it goes against the fact that constructs, by their very nature, are abstract entities: bconstructs are the abstractions that social and behavioral scientists discuss in their theoriesQ (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991, p. 42, emphasis added) , ba construct is an abstraction formed by generalization from particularsQ (Kerlinger, 1992, p. 27) , etc. Thus, at a conceptual level, SERVICE QUA-LITY can be a bphenomenon of theoretical interestQ (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000, p. 157) , while IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY IBM'S MANAGERS and IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY INDUSTRY EXPERTS are two specific instances of the denotation 2 of the (broader/ superordinate) concept SERVICE QUALITY. The denotation can, in principle, be infinite, since any concept (and, hence, SERVICE QUALITY) can be instantiated in as many time-(past/present/future) and/ or space-related (situations/persons) contexts as the author of the definition chooses. In this respect, IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY IBM'S MANAGERS (or INDUSTRY EXPERTS) simply appears to be more operational than IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY because the former is less abstract not because it is better defined.
Bearing the above in mind, the notion of construct definition as used by C-OAR-SE would benefit from some clarification. Such clarification is important for two reasons. First, at present, the degree of acceptable aggregation (viz. detail) during construct definition according to C-OAR-SE is not entirely clear: for example, is IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PER-CEIVED BY IBM'S MIDDLE MANAGERS IN TOKYO DURING 2001 an equally acceptable conceptual definition as, say, IBM'S SERVICE QUAL-ITY AS PERCEIVED BY IBM'S MANAGERS IN JAPAN? Second (and probably inadvertently), C-OAR-SE currently gives the impression that conceptual definitions can offer operational guidance for measuring a construct. This, however, is the purpose of an operational (rather than a conceptual) definition; it is the latter that seeks to bbridge the gap between the theoretical-conceptual level and the empirical-observational levelQ (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976, p. 17) and bassigns meaning to a construct . . . by specifying the activities or boperationsQ necessary to measure itQ (Kerlinger, 1992, p. 28) .
Object classification
The second step in the C-OAR-SE procedure is the classification of the focal object in one of three categories: concrete singular, abstract collective and abstract formed. According to Rossiter (2002) , differ-ent types of objects require different types of measures. Unfortunately, the basis of the object classification under C-OAR-SE is not clear in that denotative and connotative meaning appear to be confounded. Specifically, if the denotation of an object (e.g. COLA) is open to multiple interpretations, then its conceptual clarity would be negatively affected. If, however, differences in interpretation are at the level of the connotation of the object, then they should be treated as normal or expected (why should we all attribute the same connotative meaning to bCOLAQ, bCARBONATED SOFT DRINKSQ or even to a bcanQ?).
With specific reference to the three-fold classification of objects under C-OAR-SE, concrete objects are differentiated from abstract objects in that for the former bnearly everyone (of a sample) of raters describes the object identicallyQ, whereas for the latter bthe object suggests different things to the sample of ratersQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 310) . Do such differences relate to the denotative or connotative meaning of the object(s) under consideration? In the case of abstract formed objects, it would appear to be the latter since bpeople's interpretations of the object differQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 312) requiring explicit efforts towards bidentifying the main components of the object's meaningQ. However, in the case of concrete singular and abstract collective objects, the underlying basis of classification is more ambiguous, in that it may result in the same classification although a different interpretation is assigned to the object by the judges. Consider for example the case of IBM and assume that bthe group of experts agree that the object is indeed concrete singularQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 311) . In reaching this conclusion, however, one judge's mental picture of IBM might be bA LARGE MULTINA-TIONAL COMPANYQ, another judge may see IBM as bA MAJOR COMPUTER MANUFACTURERQ, and still another consider IBM as bA SYMBOL OF GLOBAL US DOMINANCEQ. Clearly the meaning of the object varies substantially across these judges, although all of them agree that IBM should be treated as a concrete singular object.
The above problem can also be encountered when an abstract collective object is involved, since the latter is defined as a bset of concrete singular objects that collectively form a higher-level category in the opinion of expertsQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 310) . In addition, judging from the examples offered by Rossiter (2002) , two distinct types of an abstract collective object can be identified. The first, denoted here as an inclusive collective object, is well illustrated by the CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS example used by Rossiter. Here, the higher-level category is formed by an exhaustive set (i.e. census) of constituents: COLAS, NON-COLAS, and CAR-BONATED MINERAL WATER (these three constituents fully capture the CARBONATED SOFT DRINKS object). The second type, denoted here as prototypical collective object, is illustrated with the FEAR APPEAL ad example, whereby the higherlevel category is described by means of a representative set (i.e. sample) of constituents (notably a range of fear appeal ads). Distinguishing between the two types of abstract collective objects (e.g. in the O-A-R expert judges' rating form-see Table 2 in Rossiter, 2002) should enhance object classification consistency among expert judges (and thus also improve content validity).
Finally, the distinction between abstract collective and abstract formed objects is also somewhat hazy in that the bconstituentsQ comprising the former and the bcomponentsQ comprising the latter are both deemed to be concrete singular objects (see Table 1 in Rossiter, 2002, p. 310) . In this context, Rossiter (2002) attempts to distinguish between the two types of objects by stating that the item parts of abstract collective objects must answer the question bWhat does it include?Q, whereas the item parts of abstract formed objects must answer the more difficult question bWhat does it mean?Q. Thus, again there seems to be confounding between denotative and connotative meaning since the question bWhat does it mean?Q is clearly just as applicable to abstract collective (and, indeed, concrete singular objects) as it is to abstract formed objects.
One approach towards resolving the above-mentioned problems would be to simply classify objects into concrete singular and abstract collective (the latter further subdivided into binclusiveQ and bprototypicalQ objects) but at the same time recognize that the constituents of abstract collective objects may themselves be multicomponential. Taking CARBO-NATED SOFT DRINKS as an example, the constituent COLAS may be seen as having different components by different people; some may associate it with a component such as Health, others with Lifestyle, and so on. A similar argument applies to the other constituents such as NON-COLAS and CAR-BONATED MINERAL WATER. Classifying objects in this way also allows for concrete singular objects (e.g. COKE) to be multicomponential in the sense discussed by Rossiter (2002) (since a concrete singular object is a special case of an abstract collective object with a single constituent). Revising Rossiter's original classification along the proposed lines allows for the separation of denotative and connotative aspects hence improving the clarity of categorization.
Attribute classification
Following object classification, the next step in the C-OAR-SE procedure is to classify the attribute of the construct, that is bthe dimension on which the object is being judgedQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 313) . Three distinct types of attributes are identified: concrete, formed, and eliciting.
A potential problem with the above classification is that while formed and eliciting attributes are clearly defined (and distinguished between them) with explicit reference to the causal relation linking the attribute and the measuring items representing their components 3 , for concrete attributes, the causal relation between attribute and measure is not considered. However, a concrete attribute can be considered to be a special case of either a formed or an eliciting attribute (i.e. when an abstract attribute has only a single component); thus issues of causal priority would appear to be just as relevant. For example, Taylor and Baker's (1994) BUYING INTENTION measure, used as an illustration by Rossiter (2002) for concrete attributes, clearly assumes that the items are reflective; presumably, however, concrete attributes under C-OAR-SE could also exist if the underlying bauxiliary theoryQ (Blalock, 1968) was based on the formative perspective.
A second issue relates to the contention that, in the case of a concrete attribute, bthere is no need to use more than a single item (part) to measure it in a scaleQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 313) . Practical considerations notwithstanding (e.g. to free up respondent time for more critical tasks), justifying a single-item measure can be difficult as one still has to address the epistemic relationship between the item (observable) and the latent variable (unobservable). If only one specific item should be used to operationalize the latent variable and no other item would be suitable (for whatever reason), then inevitably ba concept becomes its measure and has no theoretical meaning beyond that measureQ (Bagozzi, 1982, p. 15) . This implies adoption of pure operationism, a perspective which has received substantial criticism in the philosophy of science literature (e.g., see Hempel, 1953 Hempel, , 1956 . If, on the other hand, a single bgoodQ item is to be chosen from a set of potential candidates (which implies that other items could, in principle, have been used instead), the question becomes how to choose the bbestQ (or, at least, a bgoodQ) item; this question is not currently answered by Rossiter (2002) .
With respect to formed attributes, two points are worth raising. First, given that formed attributes are made up of components, each of which is a concrete attribute and given that bthe goal is to develop one good item for each first-order componentQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 314 , emphasis added), the problem previously identified regarding how to select a single bgoodQ item also applies here. Second, Rossiter (2002, p. 314) recommends that bthe formed attribute need only include its main components rather than every possible componentQ and differentiates his position from other measurement theorists who argue for a census of components (to be exact: of indicators) in the case of formative measures (e.g. Bollen & Lennox, 1991; Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001) . Here, it appears that Rossiter has somewhat misunderstood the spirit (if not the letter) of the word bcensusQ as used by the latter authors. Specifically, Bollen and Lennox (1991) use the term bcensus of indicatorsQ to distinguish the formative measurement model from its reflective counterpart where a bsampling of facetsQ is involved (consistent with the domain-sampling model and classical test theory); while they argue that bwith few exceptions each causal indicator is important to includeQ, they also explicitly state that bif an x has no association with other causal indicators, then its exclusion might have less impact than if it is correlated. Or, if an x is an exact linear combination of other xs, it provides redundant information and is therefore less criticalQ (Bollen & Lennox, 1991, p. 308) . Similarly, Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) recommend that at least one indicator for each facet (or concrete attribute in C-OAR-SE terminology) be initially included in the measure. While they indeed use statistical analysis to purify a formative measure, they also emphasize that the final set of indicators should exhibit bsufficient breadth of coverage for capturing the content of the construct. This property is of major conceptual importance. . . Indicator elimination-by whatever means-should not be divorced from conceptual considerations when a formative measurement model is involvedQ (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001, p. 273, emphasis added) .
In light of the above, it is difficult to see bthe error of using statistical analysis to delete items from formed-attribute scales (Rossiter, 2002, p. 315) . C-OAR-SE recommends a priori selection of one bgoodQ item per attribute component and no measure purification; moreover, the precise meaning of a bgoodQ item is not clearly defined under C-OAR-SE. In contrast, according to the index construction procedure developed by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) , a bgoodQ item is one that (a) captures a particular facet of the construct's domain of content, (b) is not collinear with other items, and (c) its link with the latent variable has a non-zero coefficient. Clearly, the latter procedure is much more explicit and operationally useful than the former.
Rater identification
The fourth step in the C-OAR-SE procedure is the identification of the rater entity, which is considered to be ban intrinsic component of a marketing constructQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 319, emphasis added) . Three types of rater entity are identified (individual raters, expert raters, group raters) requiring different approaches to reliability assessment (see Section 4 below).
It is difficult to see the rationale (or indeed the necessity) underlying the decision to include the rater as an integral part of a construct. Rossiter (2002, p. 318, emphasis in original) maintains that bconstructs differ depending on whose perspective they representQ and concludes that bthe rater entity is part of the constructQ. Unfortunately no explanation is given as to why this is the case (and neither is any evidence or literature cited in support of this position). In fact, taking the point concerning bperspectiveQ quite literally would result in the (surely absurd) situation that a different construct would be involved every time a different individual rater is involved! Why only distinguish between expert raters and, say, group raters and not also between different types/categories of group raters (e.g. young consumers versus old consumers) or indeed between individual decision makers (e.g. IBM middle manager X versus IBM middle manager Y)? If, indeed, bobjects' ratings cannot be divorced from the perceiverQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 318 
), then surely IBM's SERVICE QUAL-ITY AS PERCEIVED BY MANAGER X is a different construct than IBM's SERVICE QUALITY AS PERCEIVED BY MANAGER Y?
The above comments by no means imply that the identification of the relevant rater entity in measure development efforts is irrelevant or that the type of rater entity can be ignored while creating measurement items; these are important issues and acknowledged as such in the measure development literature (e.g. DeVellis, 1991; Spector, 1992; Traub, 1994) . They merely serve to question the wisdom of making the rater part of the construct itself. In fact, that the rater entity does not directly affect the measure of a construct is also implied in Rossiter's (2002, p. 324) Table 3 in which only the type of object and the type of attribute determine the enumeration rules for a scale. Bearing in mind that measurement describes bthe procedure. . . used to assign numbers that reflect the amount of an attribute possessed by an objectQ (Dillon, Madden, & Firtle, 1994, p. 286) , the rater entity will clearly affect what measurements will be obtained but should not alter which construct is being measured.
Enumeration
Because of the different types of objects and types of attributes, scale enumeration rules under C-OAR-SE brange from a single-item score equaling the total score, to two types of index, a double index, an average, and averages which are then indexedQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 324) . In all, six distinct ways for deriving a total score from the scale items are proposed.
The potential problems associated with using single-item measures (and, hence, single-item scores) have already been discussed in Section 2.3 and need not be repeated here. Attention, however, needs to be drawn to those enumeration rules associated with formed and eliciting attributes and for which some sort of index or average is recommended by C-OAR-SE. The difficulty here is that a linear composite (i.e. a weighted or unweighted sum) is not the same as a latent variable defined by (formed attribute case) or reflected in (eliciting attribute case) a set of indicators. This is clearly demonstrated by Bollen and Lennox (1991, p. 310 , emphasis added) who conclude that bin both cases the linear composite has less than perfect correlation with the latent variable D 1 . In both cases this correlation can be altered by weighting the indicators. Even with optimal weightings, the correlation of D 1 with the composite is reduced from one due to error variance. . . For effect indicators, the origin of the error in the composite is the measurement error in the indicators. For the causal indicators, error variance is due to the equation disturbance~1, which affects D 1 , but which is uncorrelated with the xs. Regardless of these differences, the linear composite is not equivalent to the latent variableQ. Whether the ensuing divergence is large enough to matter from a practical point of view is, of course, an empirical matter. Nevertheless, the differences between using indexes or averages versus directly modeling a latent variable by means of its indicators (whether formative in the case of formed attributes or reflective in the case of eliciting attributes) ought to at least be acknowledged.
Construct validity and predictive validity
According to Rossiter (2002, pp. 326 and 332) , bthe C-OAR-SE procedure to scale development relies totally on content validity to prove that it provides better measures than does the traditional procedure. . .content validity. . .is all-important, necessary, and sufficient for use of a scaleQ. The emphasis on content validity is partly grounded on C-OAR-SE's designation as a rationalist procedure (an issue taken up in Section 5) and partly on a dismissal of alternative forms of validity (which is the issue addressed in this section).
Referring to Campbell and Fiske's (1959) multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) matrix, Rossiter (2002) first queries the usefulness of the convergent validity construct. Using Smith's (1999) modified SERVQ-UAL scale as an illustration, he correctly points out that bthe new scale correlated very highly with the original scale, thus showing bconvergentQ validity but not showing which was the more valid scaleQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 326) . However, his attempt to dismiss bdivergentQ (discriminant) validity bfor the same reasonQ is questionable and not equally convincing. In seeking to establish that two measurement scales exhibit convergent validity, the question bwhich one is better?Q is a legitimate question (since both measures are purposely designed to measure the same construct). This question, however, is not relevant when seeking to establish discriminant validity since only one of the measures involved is a measure of the focal construct. Establishing discriminant validity simply means that bone can empirically differentiate the construct from other constructs that may be similar and that one can point out what is unrelated to the constructQ (Kerlinger, 1992, p. 421 , emphasis in the original). Indeed, discriminant validity would appear to be particularly applicable to scales developed using the C-OAR-SE procedure because two constructs may differ only in terms of, say, the rater entity 4 ; assessment of discriminant validity should help provide empirical confirmation of the distinctiveness of the construct. Rossiter's (2002, p. 326) more general assertion that bvalidity should be established for a scale independently, and as far as possible, absolutely, not relatively via its correlation or lack of correlation with other measuresQ is also highly questionable.
First, by definition, only face and content validity can be established independently (i.e. in the absence of other measures); all other forms of validity (criterion, convergent, discriminant, nomological) are defined in terms of patterns of relationships with other measures (e.g., see Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Zeller & Carmines, 1980) . Second, with formative measures, it is simply not possible to undertake an bindependent assessmentQ of validity because the formative measurement model, on its own, is statistically underidentified (Bollen & Davies, 1994) 5 .
Third, to the extent that the purpose of scale development is the subsequent use of the scale in substantive research, why is it inappropriate to investigate bthe extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measuredQ (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 23) ? What is so wrong with, for example, examining the construct validity of a scale measuring IBM'S SERVICE QUALITY AS PER-CEIVED BY CUSTOMERS by correlating it to, say, the number of customer complaints received? Even if the SERVICE QUALITY scale had been developed by diligently following the C-OAR-SE procedure (thus firmly establishing its content validity), would one not be concerned if a negative relationship with customer complaints could not be established (or, even worse, if a positive relationship was, in fact, uncovered)? Surely, the fundamental idea that bvalidity is demonstrated when the empirical relationships observed with a measure match the theoretically postulated nomological net of the constructQ (Judd et al., 1991, pp. 56-57 , emphasis in original) is applicable to any measure development procedure (including C-OAR-SE)?
As far as predictive validity is concerned, Rossiter (2002, p. 327 , emphasis in original) rightly views it as inappropriate bif predictive validity is interpreted in its usual sense of trying to maximizeQ the correlation between a scale and some outcome (criterion) measure. However, he subsequently confuses predictive and nomological validity by describing the latter as a bmulti-variate extensionQ of the former (see Table 1 , p. 311). The distinction between predictive and nomological validity has to do with the extent to which a theory-based linkage can be postulated between the measure of the focal construct and a measure of another construct (e.g., see Zeller & Carmines, 1980) , rather than whether a bivariate or multivariate approach is used in the empirical analysis. As a result of this confusion, he then wrongly criticizes Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) for following bthe predictive validity approach in their 2001 paper on index measuresQ. In fact, the latter authors emphasized nomological validity not predictive validity; their approach to validation bfocusing on nomological aspects involves linking the index to other constructs with which it would be expected to be linked (i.e. antecedents and/or consequences). . . Validation along these lines requires. . .that a theoretical relationship can be postulated to exist between the two constructsQ (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001, p. 273, emphasis added) . Moreover, at no point did they try to maximize the correlation linking the index with the outcome measure (they only assess the direction and significance of the linkage and explicitly acknowledge the impact of other factors in influencing the outcome variable). Rossiter's (p. 327) dismissal of their approach as being bjust not rationalQ is simply unjustified.
Reliability
Rossiter (2002) makes a major contribution to the literature by bcustomizingQ the assessment of reliability according to the type of rater entity involved and the type of attribute to be rated (see Table 4 in original article). Interestingly, while he acknowledges that bhighly precise reliable scores can be obtained from nonvalid scalesQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 328) , for some reason he fails to also point out that black of reliability provides negative evidence of the validity of a measureQ (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002, pp. 413-414, emphasis added) . In other words, the indirect assessment of (lack of) validity through reliability assessment is not considered in C-OAR-SE.
Perhaps of greater concern is the fact that C-OAR-SE does not explicitly distinguish between different types of factors that may impact upon the reliability of scores (for a discussion, see Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002) . For example, transient personal factors (e.g. mood, health, fatigue) may impact both upon testretest reliability as well as on the reliability of the scale scores. Such factors have nothing to do with whether the items are ambiguous (a content validity issue) or whether the respondent understands the items and performs the rating task truthfully; however, they could clearly influence the precision of scores irrespective of the type of attributes or type of rater involved. Why is there is bno question of unreliabilityQ (Rossiter, 2002, p. 328) in the case of concrete and abstract formed attributes? Why could not the precision of scores be affected by, say, the mood of the respondent in repeated applications of the scale? Although the notion of reliability in an internal consistency sense is clearly inapplicable to formed attribute scales (i.e. formative measures), estimates of test-retest reliability could be legitimately generated from the scores of any kind of scale over repeated applications 6 .
Rationalism and the use of expert judges
According to Rossiter (2002, p. 308) , bthe C-OAR-SE procedure is grounded in rationalism rather than empiricismQ. However, rationalism is based on indubitable bfirst principlesQ and it has been noted that bthe rationalists in their quest for certainty were highly suspicious of the accuracy of observational processesQ (Hunt, 1991, p. 241) ; indeed, in its extreme form, rationalism held that empirical testing was unnecessary. In contrast, the emphasis of C-OAR-SE on preinterviews with raters and the involvement of expert judges throughout the process make it very much an empirically grounded procedure. This it is difficult to see the rationale (or indeed the necessity) for tying C-OAR-SE to a rationalist view of science.
Regarding the use of expert judges, two issues are worth pointing out. First, is it expertise in the substantive area (i.e. expert knowledge of the topic) that is of greater importance or expertise in measure development (i.e. methodological expertise)? Although Rossiter (2002) does not explicitly address this issue, research in the area of questionnaire design/pretesting shows that both types of expertise may be relevant and complementary (see Diamantopoulos, Schlegelmilch, & Reynolds, 1994) . Specifically, substantive expertise would appear to be particularly useful for construct definition and object classification purposes (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), whereas methodological expertise for attribute classification purposes (see Section 2.3). It goes without saying that methodology experts should be both familiar with and open-minded towards a formative measurement perspective rather than being devout followers of classical test theory and the domainsampling model; otherwise, such bexpertiseQ may well turn out to be a liability during scale development efforts using the C-OAR-SE procedure.
A second issue relates to the implications for C-OAR-SE if the expert judges bget it wrongQ when classifying objects, attributes, etc. (see Table 2 in Rossiter, 2002) . While the use of experts is generally beneficial in that they can provide bvaluable and reliable information on the state of knowledge in their field, on how to solve problems, and on the certainty of their answersQ (Meyer & Booker, 1991, p. 18) , empirical research has also uncovered an binvertedQ expertise effect whereby bin many studies, experts do not perform impressively at allQ (Johnson, 1988, p. 209) . Although an analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of expertise is clearly beyond the confines of the present paper (see Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988 for a comprehensive discussion), the sole reliance of C-OAR-SE on expert judges for establishing the validity of a measure is rather disturbing. If one accepts that experts are not infallible, then additional checks on validity are not only desirable but essential. In this context, as discussed in Section 3, both discriminant and nomological validation would appear to be eminently applicable to measures developed following the C-OAR-SE procedure and would complement the rigorous checks on content validation already emphasized (and rightly so).
Conclusion
Rossiter (2002) has rendered a major service to the academic marketing community through the development of the C-OAR-SE procedure. The latter encourages a much more flexible and open-minded approach towards scale development and releases researchers from the shackles of conventional test theory as the only acceptable way for developing sound marketing measures. At the same time, as the current paper has shown, there are several problematic issues associated with the C-OAR-SE procedure as it currently stands. These include potential confounding of denotative and connotative meaning during construct definition and object classification; the use of single-item measures and construction of formed attribute scales; the incorporation of the rater entity as part of the focal construct; and the sole reliance on content validity. It is hoped that this comment will stimulate further discussion and debate on the C-OAR-SE procedure, eventually leading to appropriate revisions (some of which were suggested in this paper), thus further enhancing its effectiveness and appeal.
